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In a public statement in January 
of this year, Joaquin Almunia – EU 
Commissioner for competition – 
regretted that officials working for 
the European institutions in Brussels 
are in the same situation: he himself, 
for instance, would not be able to 
subscribe to Spanish pay TV from 
his current address in Brussels. He 
also noted that pay TV services are 
not accessible – for instance via 
the Internet – from Member States 
other than the one in which they 
are subscribed. There is, in other 
words, no cross-border ‘portability’ 
of subscriptions.
The main reason why markets for 
pay TV services are still partitioned 
along national borders is well 
known, and it is that there is no EU-
wide copyright title. Right holders 
(including film studios and national 
football leagues) must license their 
content on a national basis, and Pay 
TV operators acquire the rights to 
broadcast an event or a film only 
in a given EU Member State. As a 
result, these same operators cannot 
provide their services in countries in 
which they do not operate, or for 
which they do not hold licences.
It follows that a true single market 
for broadcasting services could 
emerge only with the licensing of 
television rights on a pan-European 
basis. Accordingly, if the current 
situation is indeed as problematic 
as Commissioner Almunia suggests, 
the natural solution must necessarily 
involve the adoption of legislation 
expanding the territorial scope of 
intellectual property rights. In fact, 
the EU Commission (and more 
precisely the Directorate General for 
internal market affairs) is currently 
reviewing copyright rules. In the 
different policy documents issued 
to date, several ambitious proposals, 
aimed at enhancing the cross-border 
provision and access of protected 
works, are sketched.
It is unclear, however, whether 
the further integration of national 
copyright systems (or even the 
creation of an EU-wide one) is a 
political priority at this stage. The 
launch of a long-awaited White 
Paper – which tends to be a reliable 
indicator of the likely adoption 
of legislation at the EU level at a 
subsequent stage – has been delayed 
until at least the appointment 
of a new EU Commission. In this 
context, the Directorate General for 
Competition has decided to explore 
the extent to which the objectives 
that would be more logically 
achieved through ad hoc legislation 
on intellectual property could instead 
be furthered through the application 
of EU competition rules.
It is in this context that Commissioner 
Almunia announced in January 2014 
the opening of an investigation 
into the agreements concluded 
between five of the six Hollywood 
major studios and pay TV operators 
in several Member States, including 
the UK. The suggestion is that the 
observed absence of portability and 
cross-border supply of premium 
television services may be the 
consequence of a set of agreements 
restricting competition between 
operators and thus in violation 
of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU. The 
investigation is still ongoing.
Action by the EU Commission 
follows the ruling of the European 
Court of Justice in Murphy, (Joined 
Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08), a 
case which received widespread 
publicity in the UK. Karen Murphy 
was the owner of a British pub in 
Portsmouth, who sought to avoid 
the subscription fees charged by 
Sky – the holder of the rights to 
the FA Premier League in the UK at 
the time – by importing a decoder 
from Greece. In its 2011 judgment, 
the ECJ held that an agreement 
limiting the ability of the Greek 
broadcaster to supply its decoding 
devices outside of its home Member 
State amounted to a restriction of 
competition within the meaning of 
the abovementioned provision.
The Murphy ruling extended to 
the broadcasting arena a long line 
of case law pursuant to which 
agreements restricting the cross-
border trade of goods or services 
have been considered to be among 
the most egregious violations of EU 
competition law. The result may 
seem surprising, but one should 
not forget that competition policy 
in the EU has been, from the 
outset, an instrument to achieve the 
integration of national economies. 
As a result, Article 101 of the Treaty 
can in principle apply even when, 
as in the present case, geographic 
market partitioning seems to be 
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largely the inevitable consequence 
of the exercise of intellectual 
property rights.
The EU Commission is now 
looking into pay TV agreements 
to determine whether they include 
contractual restraints that purport 
to limit the territorial reach of the 
services provided by the licensees in 
each Member State. Underlying the 
investigation there is the assumption 
that, if the contested restraints were 
to be removed, pay TV operators 
would compete against one another 
for subscribers. That is to say, for 
example, Canal+ would offer its 
services to (among others) French 
expatriates based in London and 
other British towns in competition 
with local providers. Similarly, 
broadcasters like Sky would provide 
subscriptions to British citizens living 
in Paris or the South of France (and 
others, such as French nationals 
interested in an extensive coverage 
of, for instance, the FA Premier 
League). Increased cross-border 
competition, in turn, would on this 
theory lead to lower prices and 
other benefits for consumers.
But it is not at all clear that the 
scenario envisioned by the EU 
Commission will be achieved 
through intervent ion under 
competition law. The form of 
cross-border competition which 
Commissioner Almunia seems to 
want may simply not be possible in 
the pay TV segment. It is true that 
there are many sectors in which 
firms rival one another ‘within’ 
the market: think, for example, of 
restaurants, supermarkets, airlines or 
broadband Internet. In all of these 
firms are present simultaneously in a 
given geographic area to offer their 
services. 
But a look at the dynamics of the 
industry clearly shows that rivalry 
in television takes a different form. 
Broadcasters compete ‘for’ the 
market, not ‘within’ it. Rivalry, in 
other words, is of the ‘winner-takes-
all’ type. Every three or five years 
pay TV operators bid to acquire the 
rights to offer a particular type of 
content on an exclusive basis.
Against this background, it appears 
that the EU Commission would like 
to see the emergence of a form of 
rivalry that cannot and perhaps even 
should not exist – not even at the 
national level. Exclusivity is after all 
in the interest of both broadcasters 
and right holders. The contractual 
restraints that are the subject of 
the ongoing investigation are 
primarily aimed at ensuring that 
the rights will be exploited in the 
manner agreed upon by the parties. 
This raises a number of questions, 
most fundamentally, whether an 
agreement can be said to violate 
competition law if the rivalry it is 
said to restrict is commercially not 
practical. 
A second, related, question is 
whether the EU Commission has 
evidence to the effect that the 
absence of cross-border competition 
is the consequence of the contested 
restraints. It is not clear whether, 
and if so how, the EU Commission 
would be able to show that, in 
a ‘but for’ world, cross-border 
competition would have emerged. 
There have been several intellectual 
property-related cases in which 
the Commission failed to provide 
evidence of a similar nature. The 
most obvious example that comes 
to mind is CISAC. In that case, the 
EU Commission argued that the 
absence of cross-border competition 
among copyright collecting societies 
within the EU was the consequence 
of a ‘concerted practice’. The 
General Court of the EU annulled 
the decision, and took the view 
that the absence of rivalry could 
be plausibly explained on other 
grounds.
A third question raised by the 
investigation relates to the benefits 
expected from intervention. It is 
far from obvious that reducing the 
degree of territorial protection will 
result in benefits for EU consumers. 
In fact, it may very well end up 
harming them – in particular the 
less well-off. Market partitioning 
may be against the objectives of 
the EU, but it allows firms to reach 
consumers in all countries. Absent 
segmentation, serving consumers in 
low-income countries may endanger 
the profits made in high-income 
ones. As a result, firms may decide 
to stop providing their services (or 
to degrade the quality thereof) 
altogether in the former. This is not 
theoretical or speculative. In the 
aftermath of the Murphy ruling, the 
quality and breadth of broadcasts of 
the FA Premier League has decreased 
in Greece. This is a natural response 
to the emergence of a grey market. 
Similar effects are possible in the 
pay TV context..
Intervention to promote portability 
and cross-border access to pay TV 
services is potentially far-reaching. It 
could lead to major changes to the 
way in which premium rights are 
licensed by film studios and other 
organisations. Such an outcome 
would confirm the perception of 
many commentators, who have 
claimed in recent years that the EU 
Commission has increasingly made 
use of its powers in the field not so 
much to preserve competition but 
to regulate and re-shape markets 
in accordance with a preconceived 
idea of how the industry should be 
organised. From this perspective, 
the pay TV investigation would 
be an attempt to achieve through 
competition law the objectives of 
the review of EU copyright rules, 
around which political consensus is 
proving difficult to gather.
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